

DURING WINTER, the Po Valley in northern Italy disappears under a blanket of thick fog. In cities such as Mantua, even at midday visibility often extends no more than a few meters, with street and house lights little more than hazy yellow blurs. Only by dint of severe eyestrain is it possible to seize the contours of the landscape, the configurations of buildings, the shapes of cities: everything lies concealed beneath a pervasive, bone-chilling fog.

Driving through the urban hinterland of Los Angeles offers a nearly identical experience, particularly heading east through what is called the Inland Empire. But here the eye-straining dimness occurs at high noon in the middle of summer, and the yellow-brown smog is illuminated by sunlight that feebly pierces the thick layer of atmospheric pollutants. Smog envelops everything from downtown L.A. east, but the farther east you travel, the thicker, stickier, and fouler smelling it becomes.

To southern Californians, smog seems almost a natural artifact, part of the price inevitably paid for a year-round temperate climate. But filthy air, far from natural, is a direct consequence of deliberate development policies relentlessly pursued in southern California throughout the 20th century. The urban form of the built environment in Los Angeles accords Angelenos the privilege of breathing foul air and thereby poisoning their lungs and those of their children on a level probably matched only by coal miners.¹ The building of Los Angeles and southern California brought other dubious achievements: it has allowed the inhabitants to simultaneously overpump and poison the rich artesian springs throughout the basin, then to foul the ocean with toxic runoff and emissions from a ring of refineries circling the south bay; it has



Way of the Locust Built Ecology

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so concentrated salts in the groundwater that eventually the Inland Empire will have to be abandoned; it has vanquished age-old ecosystems, consigning species of flora and fauna to extinction without a second thought; it has so recklessly reshaped and remodeled the landscape that, much like the areas adjacent to the Mississippi River before July 1993, it is a series of disasters waiting to happen.²

If the intimate connection between these facts and architecture is not readily apparent, it is because for too long architects have abjured any responsibility for the manifold consequences of the buildings, airports, subdivisions, shopping malls, office parks, skyscrapers, new towns, factories, and other artifacts that they design. Beginning in school, students are taught to disregard everything other than the form and internalized function of the aesthetic objects they produce. They are

taught that the measure of their accomplishment is the affirmative judgment of their formal virtuosity pronounced by their professors and by other design professionals. In other words, they are taught that only by simplifying, abstracting, or ignoring most of the problems connected to their designs will they be able to achieve success as architects. The building of Los Angeles and its vast periphery, whether planned or unplanned, provides a towering counterpoint to the simple-minded verities of contemporary architecture.³


Although he drew entirely different conclusions from the same evidence, Reyner Banham was one of the first architectural critics to notice many of the characteristics of building and architecture in Los Angeles.⁴ In *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies*, he chastised the conventional commentaries on archi-

itecture that ignored "pop ephemerae, . . . freeway structures and other civil engineering" on the grounds that they "are as crucial to the human ecologies and built environments of Los Angeles as are dated works in classified styles by named architects."⁵

But despite his wide-ranging appreciation of the built environment, Banham was almost oblivious to the imperatives of the natural ecosystem, the unbuilt environment: "Whatever man has done subsequently to the climate and environment of Southern California, it remains one of the ecological wonders of the habitable world."⁶ Wonder, indeed; but only in its candidacy for supreme environmental destruction. For Banham, the first ecology, "surfurbia," and its spectacular beachfront homes and generous beaches only required "vigilance" to avoid becoming a dumping ground for cost-



Richard Haas, Sky Lobby mural in Home Savings of America Tower, Los Angeles, 1988.



◀ Judith F. Baca, *The Great Wall of Los Angeles, Van Nuys, California, 1983.*

ogies of the Los Angeles Rim

cutting industries and public services. Instead, the bay has been ruthlessly and systematically polluted by industries and cities, and the beaches themselves have had to be augmented by infusions of sand, since the systematic control of the Los Angeles basin's rivers has interrupted the natural cycles whereby beaches are created.

Banham also celebrated the housing built along the flanks of the Santa Monica Mountains and the Hollywood Hills as "classic Los Angeles foothill settlements."⁷ Subsequent foothill developments – at Los Feliz, Beverly Hills, Bel Air, Pacific Palisades, and Brentwood around the basin, and then east to Highland Park, Pasadena, San Marino, Sierra Madre, and Monrovia – were simply variations on the same theme. Such hillside sites adjacent to wilderness areas "seem to cry out for affluent suburban residences. . . . Watered,

[they] will carry almost any kind of vegetation."⁸ Architects responded to the design challenges of hillside construction with flair and originality. Some of the most inventive houses – by Craig Ellwood, John Lautner, and Pierre Koenig – were lifted off the ground to afford spectacular wide-angle views of the city and the ocean.

Elsewhere, developers were less individualistic and more ruthless. Banham described the tiers and terraces carved into the mountains that surround Los Angeles in order to build houses on level surfaces, but even though he recognized that there were ecological implications to this manner of building, he stopped short of adopting the position of the "Jeremiahs at Berkeley and in the Sierra Club."⁹ With a classic faith in the power of people to move mountains, Banham insisted that regulations and codes could control the forces that led to major slides,

and in any case, the worst construction had occurred in northern rather than southern California.

Events have given the lie to Banham's twin articles of faith in human ingenuity and well-enforced codes to contain the forces of nature: mountains rather than people have done the moving. The San Gabriel Mountains, relatively young tectonically, are rising steadily, and as they do, masses of boulders, gravel, and sand stream down their flanks in phenomena known as debris flows, plowing through homes, streets, barricades, and anything else Angelenos have confidently perched in their path. The enormous engineering works muscled against this relentless movement, including vast basins and dams built to contain the debris, are only minor impediments to the downward flow of the mountains. And still the houses go up, streets are paved, and home-

owners profess ignorance and amazement when their garages and homes fill up with mud, gravel, and boulders.¹⁰ Earthquakes also trigger movement in the mountains, which results in boulders and debris being shed, followed, when it rains, by the inevitable debris flows. Dozens of debris basins erected by Los Angeles taxpayers to protect the foolhardy require constant cleanouts and are unable to contain overflows.

The swath of territory to the north, east, and south of Los Angeles was built up at different paces during the 20th century. Development falls into one of two types: planned and unplanned. In this essay, I will examine the unplanned variant in the Inland Empire (Riverside and San Bernardino counties) and in Orange, Ventura, and Los Angeles counties, and the so-called planned growth in the Orange County city of Irvine.

Residential development exploded precisely in these seemingly remote areas from the late 1970s on – areas that could still be called the far fringes of Los Angeles in 1981 – smothering orange groves and agricultural land beneath concrete, asphalt, and tract houses. After World War II, the tide of settlement flowed east from the San Gabriels in a pattern familiar from early-20th-century development in the L.A. basin but that spread beyond, domino fashion, to the San Fernando Valley, to the western edge of the Antelope Valley in Leona Valley, to the San Gabriel Valley, and then out on all sides, to the northeast of Los Angeles toward the Mojave Desert, and to the southeast in former agricultural areas such as Temecula. A vast ring of bedroom communities sprang up in which the maximum number of people could live out the single-family-home version of the American dream. These pristine desert lands promised freedom from the urban ills associated with Los Angeles – traffic, gangs, crime. But the promise proved illusory, because those same problems followed the commuters right out to their new suburbs.

The commuter zone first extended some 20 or 25 miles from downtown Los Angeles and included the San Fernando Valley, some of the San Gabriel Valley, and the northern section of Orange County. By 1970 the commuter range had risen to 30 or 35 miles and by 1980 to 50 miles from downtown, beginning to penetrate Ventura, Riverside, and San




Bernardino counties.¹¹ In the subsequent decade, the commuter zone extended deep into Riverside County as far as Temecula, Hemet, and Moreno Valley; farther into San Bernardino County to Apple Valley, Adelanto, and Big Bear; and finally to the northernmost reaches of Los Angeles County, to Palmdale, Lancaster, and Antelope Valley – distances of 60 to 90 miles, sometimes even more. Although the Inland Empire, hemmed in by mountain ranges and blasted by searing summer heat, endures the area's most devastating smog, air quality is only marginally better in communities closer to Los Angeles such as Pasadena and San Marino.¹²

Cities such as Palmdale, Moreno Valley, Rancho Cucamonga, Adelanto, and Valencia suddenly appeared in place of tiny villages or plots of desert land, now transformed overnight into endless acres of interchangeable tract homes serviced only by expansive shopping malls. At one time it even looked as if Kern County, just south of Fresno, would come to provide bedrooms for L.A.'s hungry laborers.¹³ During the 1980s, population almost doubled in the Inland Empire, from 1.6 million to 2.9 million people. Exponentially rising housing costs within the L.A. basin intersected with increasing demand for low- and moderately priced housing from 1978 onward, as a mixed bag of junk-bond-laden nouveau riche yuppies, Rust Belt refugees, wealthy Iranians following the shah, Korean and Southeast Asian entrepreneurs, Central American victims of Reagan policies, and Mexican emigres all converged on southern California in the space of a few short years. The demand spilled over the San Gabriels into the Inland Empire, as communities closer to L.A. resisted attempts to increase the stock of affordable housing. The affluent communities of San Marino, Bradbury, and Rolling Hills Estates even proposed to count maids' quarters and caretakers' cottages in a desperate bid to meet state-mandated quotas for affordable housing – without actually having to build any.¹⁴

These suburbs serviced the city by sending workers on commutes of up to four hours per day, ensuring not only monumental traffic jams and slowdowns but also the persistence of intense smog for the better part of the year. An 80-mile drive might require one and a quarter hour's driving elsewhere, but here it could easily consume up to three hours, even in

California tract homes under construction at Lakewood in the San Fernando Valley, 1950.



the absence of a major accident. In the building fever of the late 1970s and 1980s, builders, politicians, and residents were sublimely indifferent to the possible consequences of such development. As always happens in southern California when money is to be made, such questions were brushed aside as barriers to progress.

Opposition to the relentless expansion coalesces around two concerns: quality of life and environmental effects. Residents of rural communities oppose the suburbanization of mountains and deserts on the grounds that the quality of their life will be irreparably eroded by what they perceive as the unmitigated greed of developers. Such is the case for the residents of Antelope Acres, 12 miles north of Lancaster in the high desert. First settled in 1948, Antelope Acres consists of about 400 mostly frame cottages on lots of one and one-half to five acres, ample for horses, chickens, and even bird sanctuaries.¹⁵ The city of Lancaster annexed 885 acres south of the town and plans to have the Larwin Land Company of Encino erect 2,000 homes on the site, effectively turning the original community into a tiny oasis in a sea of tract homes.

Not far away, a heated debate throughout 1992 pitted opponents of the \$2 million Moreno Highlands megadevelopment in the San Jacinto Valley against other residents and even the city council. The town of Moreno Valley exploded during the 1980s, and the steady increase in smog and encroachment on open and wilderness areas brought planners, environmentalists, and residents into conflict with elected officials. The site where two Denver and Chicago families, the Cohens and Crowns, plan a mini-city of nearly 8,000 homes, serviced by 24 miles of new roads, also happens to be the habitat of peregrine falcons, golden eagles, and other endangered species. Although the developers claim that areas will be set aside for these animals, environmentalists and even state officials say that the planned reserves are totally inadequate. The 30,000 new residents expected for the area amount to an addition of one-fourth of the current population of Moreno Valley.¹⁶

The biggest white elephant of all is the proposed Tejon Ranch development, on a parcel of land the size of the city of Los Angeles along the Grapevine between Los Angeles and Kern counties. Although

development is in the earliest stages now, the *Los Angeles Times*, which owns a third of Tejon Ranch's stock, is preparing the way with cautious articles about the environmentally sensitive plans being developed by the company.¹⁷

One of the great shibboleths of such developments is the claim that they will provide jobs in a time of recession.¹⁸ But once the houses and business park have been built, not nearly enough employment will be generated to support the new community, particularly when the jobless rate is inching higher every month. Such is the case elsewhere in the Inland Empire, where factory outlets, shopping malls, and automobile dealerships can absorb only a limited number of workers. The steady decline in property values and the strains on Riverside County's social services hardly argue for yet more tracts of housing. Other losers from overdevelopment include Oxnard, whose prototypical American downtown has been destroyed by the proliferation of strip malls on the city's outskirts.¹⁹

To finish off the job that the mosaic of tract homes started, politicians and plan-

ners in Los Angeles County have their sights set on five desert areas in the Inland Empire as waste-disposal areas for Los Angeles. Waste-by-rail is scheduled for Eagle Mountain, an abandoned mine on the border of the Joshua Tree National Monument, and Amboy in the Mojave

Desert, where trash is to be deposited in enormous caverns being dug for the purpose. Two more hazardous-waste sites and one low-grade nuclear waste dump are scheduled for Highway 40, between Barstow and Needles.²⁰

The common view of the desert lands that extend to the Arizona border is that they are available for any speculative use, from a thoroughfare to Las Vegas or Palm Springs to a venue for dirt bikes or off-road vehicles. Yet the seemingly barren deserts are habitats for innumerable species of flora and fauna. Environmental concerns extend from the needs of endangered species to the problems of erosion and flooding to the most serious of all, contamination of groundwater. Although city and county officials insist that they can devise adequate protection, anyone who has followed the saga of Rocky Flats



From *The City Assembled* by Susan Kozminski. © 1992 by Susan Kozminski. By permission of Little, Brown & Company.

in Colorado and other nuclear facilities will be skeptical of official assurances. The high fees that Riverside County will be able to charge for each ton of refuse accepted persuaded county officials to support the project, even though planners in the urban areas envision sending six trains and 200 trucks belching diesel fumes into the Inland Empire deserts every day.

During the booming economy of the 1980s, and indeed throughout the cold war years, when the proliferation of defense industry contractors and military bases created the illusion that economic expansion was destined to last forever, southern California seemed miraculously immune to the economic swings that afflicted other parts of the nation. Fifty years of prosperity seduced politicians, entrepreneurs, and citizens into believing that the boom would go on forever. Alas, capitalism endlessly repeats itself: with the steady closing of defense bases and defense industry suppliers, as well as the decline of international trade in the wake of a worldwide recession, unemployment there has risen dramatically over the last three years, and property values have

dropped as much as 30 percent. The hopeful pursuers of the American dream who purchased dream houses in Palmdale, Temecula, and Adelanta suddenly found themselves with unpaid mortgages in amounts greater than the value of their homes. When unemployment struck their spanking-new communities, there were no jobs; forced to put their houses on the market, they found no buyers.

The human and environmental tragedies now being configured in these areas could have been predicted, and the disasters to come are being predicted today. Indignant urban planners and architects regularly decried the mindless sprawl that consumes hundreds of thousands of acres of pristine landscape every year. But planned developments in southern California are hardly an alternative. The city of Irvine was developed on the extensive lands of the Irvine Ranch Company, originally purchased in 1876 from drought-stricken Mexican-American ranchers and slowly transformed from range land to a giant agribusiness.²¹ During the post-World War II suburban explosion in southern California, Myford Irvine began to turn the Irvine Company

into a real estate development firm, taking advantage in particular of the miles of prime oceanfront land between Newport Bay and Laguna Beach owned by the ranch. Instead of selling the houses and lots, the Irvine Company offered long-term leases, retaining a degree of control unusual in American real estate.

The luxury subdivisions, with tennis courts, pools, and clubhouses, differed substantially from the endless FHA-financed tracts of middle-class homes prevalent in southern California. But the biggest development money lay with middle-income homes, so the Irvine Company came under intense pressure to sell blocks of land to developers. Instead, in 1958 the owners chose the option presented by the regents of the University of California: to build a new university on Irvine land, with a new city to service it. William Pereira, who had originally proposed the site to the regents, was chosen to design a comprehensive land-use master plan for the university, city, and environs.²² The explicit program was to build the ideal city of the future, drawing ideas from the best designers and the most experienced planners, and especially benefiting from the errors of the past. Unlike ordinary, developer-built suburbs, Irvine would be neat and orderly, its infrastructure buried underground, its carefully bordered and trimmed roads leading to diverse types of housing, shopping centers, and business parks. Instead of a sea of tract homes, Irvine was to be divided into villages, each with a number of housing types and a dominant architectural style, not to mention schools, shopping districts, churches, and community pools.

Despite decades of scorn heaped on Levittown and its successors, the first thing the architects did in Irvine was embrace the key features of the archetypal suburb – identical rows of stucco townhouses, apartments, and houses whose modest variations only emphasize their uniformity. A second, equally timid gesture was to repeat the worst features of the average business park, surrounding glass-sheathed boxes with seas of parking. The abandonment of any comprehensive architectural vision is breathtaking. The inhabitants are equally homogeneous: middle- to upper-middle-class white professionals, a sprinkling of Asians, and a tiny number of Latinos and African-Americans. The glue holding it all together is the typically Californian obsession with maintaining property values, a dicey proposition in today's southern

California. Hence the power of the homeowner associations, which aggressively contain any loose architectural or landscape cannons that might unwittingly roll in.

As the homogeneity of residents and residence configures the nightmare of modern architecture, the ideal of the perfect city crumbles in the face of market forces and real estate strategies. Although the initial idea was that residents could work and live in the same area, two things conspired against this goal from the outset. Housing prices and availability effectively limit the number and class of inhabitants, and the business parks, occupied chiefly by aerospace companies, electronics firms, and research-and-development industries, have been so successful that far more people work here than originally anticipated. Irvine is therefore a net importer of workers. Add this to a general design absolutely dependent on the automobile for even the most trivial activity, and you end up with traffic congestion and pollution comparable to that of older cities – precisely the models that Irvine's design was intended to surpass. The Irvine Company and the city council steadfastly resisted mass transit facilities, let alone low-income housing. A lawsuit charging the Irvine Company with violation of state laws regarding low-income housing was not settled until the late 1970s, when plans were outlined for a dramatic increase in development.

Although this forced the admission of a marginally more diverse population, Irvine maintains control over the environment and potential troubles, from gangs to homelessness, in part through the most suburban of design strategies: there is no downtown. With their milling crowds and lingering strollers, downtowns are far less susceptible to formal and informal measures of control than are suburbs under the watchful eye of homeowners' associations. Most of all, they encourage visits from precisely those groups that the planning process sought to banish. It is not difficult to imagine that to youngsters brought up in Irvine, Disneyland's Main Street in nearby Anaheim offers the only remotely urban experience they are likely to have.

The University of California, Irvine – sprawling over a broad area, with signature buildings dotting the landscape and serviced only by a singularly unsuccessful

mini-mall – certainly cannot fulfill the role of a public arena. For architects, the university's most notable feature is its designer architecture: buildings by Frank Gehry, Rebecca Binder, Robert Venturi, Robert A. M. Stern, James Stirling and Michael Wilford, and Charles Moore, among others. With the exception of Gehry's engineering center and Binder's student lounge, however, most of the designs are dog-eared variations on well-known themes. Set far apart from one another and into thoroughly uninspired landscaping, only the occasional bright color distinguishes them from the nearby business parks.

It is no small irony that the Maguire Thomas Partnership plan for Playa Vista, just a few dozen miles away on the Los Angeles coast, has been presented as similarly bold, innovative, and future oriented, even though, as at Irvine, no controls mandate sales and rentals only to those who work in the area.²³ Hope springs eternal that architects can somehow pull solutions for the design of new cities out of their hats; but Irvine is an alarming indication of what Playa Vista might turn out to be. Worse yet, much of the Ballona Wetlands, one of the few remaining wetlands in southern California and certainly the only significant remaining open space within the basin, will be sealed with concrete except for a dainty preserve left over as a sort of eco-amusement park for L.A.'s prosperous west side.

More than 30 years ago, the Irvine Company brokered a deal to donate land to the University of California in exchange for development rights, just as President Donald Bren has recently donated 17,000 acres of land, including Limestone Canyon, in exchange for permission to develop adjacent land without cumbersome and irritating planning oversight. Only the occasional townhouse or apartment building in Irvine, Tustin, and other Irvine Ranch Company bedroom communities departs significantly from the relentless expansion into the desert by tract developers. The marginal gestures to preservation of the environment and open space are little more than shrewd maneuvers to defuse opposition to planned developments on other company lands.²⁴

Despite the growing problems with water, subsidence, pollution, and waste disposal, the tide of single-family tract house development rolls relentlessly forward, from long-range plans for Tejon Ranch to

eager plans to tame the Santa Clara River and line it with concrete, malls, and tract homes.²⁵ Although the plans for Tejon Ranch, a parcel of land the size of Los Angeles, are alarming for their scale and their intrusion into previously pristine mountains north of Los Angeles, the Santa Clara River is probably the most typical example of development southern California style, casting into high relief the battle between developers and conservationists. The hundred miles of the Santa Clara are the state's longest and wildest waterway and boast the largest, best-preserved riparian woodland in southern California. The river supports five endangered species – three birds, one fish, and one plant – and nourishes a \$125 million citrus crop.

But the competing interests waging war over the river's future are irreconcilable. Developers covet 30 miles of the river between Santa Clarita and Fillmore, which they envision lined with five commercial centers, a shopping district, an industrial area, and thousands of homes. The farmers, on the other hand, want the river controlled to protect their orchards – planted here precisely because of the rich river-bottom soil – from dangerous winter floods. Although growers have bermed and bulldozed the river for decades, the Santa Clara meanders precisely where it wants to, which is often over their citrus orchards. Gravel miners, who plow up vegetation and disperse silt, have been raiding the river bottom's hundreds of feet of aggregate since the 19th century, and they want to increase their take rather than limit it. Like the developers and growers, they cite progress, development, and cultivation as automatic social benefits that justify taming the river, and they have no patience with environmentalists' concerns. The pro-development forces are convinced that the river can and should be controlled, but the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers flatly rejects their arguments. Fresh from the losing battle with the supposedly long-tamed Mississippi River and the ongoing struggle to keep the Mississippi from diverting its flow into the Atchafalaya River, the Corps has finally recognized that the grand engineering feats accomplished on rivers such as the Santa Clara always end up diminishing the resource and costing far more to preserve than is ever anticipated at the outset. Once tracts of homes go up along the river banks, extraordinary measures will be necessary to protect the occupants from floods, and even the

most elaborate measures too often fail. Rivers go their own way, or exact a terrible price from those who attempt to confine them.

Where will it end in southern California? The natural barriers to endless development have been systematically overcome without regard to short-term or long-term costs, and the planning of Irvine only marginally improves on that of Moreno Valley or Palmdale. Developers still sweep up their profits and leave the social, political, and environmental costs for the taxpayers to shoulder. And nature, as the Mississippi tellingly demonstrated last summer, will not passively yield to the dictates of man.

Postscript: This article, based on class lectures I gave in 1992 and 1993, was submitted shortly before the Malibu Fire in November 1993 and the Northridge Earthquake of January 1994. In retrospect, I should have written, "Los Angeles is a series of disasters waiting to happen." ■

1 The best study of the politics of air pollution in Los Angeles is Eric Mann and the Watchdog Organizing Committee, *L.A.'s Lethal Air: New Strategies for Policy, Organizing, and Action* (Los Angeles: Labor/Community Strategy Center, 1991). A study now in progress by this same organization is demonstrating that although air pollution spares no one in southern California, other kinds of toxic poisoning disproportionately strike the poor.

2 Norris Hundley, Jr., *The Great Thirst: Californians and Water, 1770s–1990s* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 373–80; Donald Pisani, *From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and the West, 1850–1931* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); Marc Reisner, *Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water* (New York: Viking, 1986); Barry Commoner, *Making Peace With the Planet* (New York: Pantheon, 1990); John McPhee, *The Control of Nature* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1989), pp. 183–272. The best history of southern California's development in general remains Carey McWilliams, *Southern California: An Island on the Land* (1946; reprint ed., Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1973). More recent critical analyses of southern California and spatial change are Edward Soja et al., "Urban Restructuring: An Analysis of Social and Spatial Change in Los Angeles," *Economic Geography* 59 (April 1979), pp. 80–106; and Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies* (London: Verso, 1990).

3 I have written about the social and political role of design in Los Angeles elsewhere; see "The Postmodern Geography of Los Angeles," *Design Book Review*, Summer 1991, pp. 86–91; "Los Angeles Architecture, 1970–90," *A & V* 32 (December 1991); "What Price Paradise?" *Architectural Review*, December 1987, pp. 85–89. The most compelling account of Los Angeles to appear since McWilliams is Mike Davis, *City of Quartz* (London: Verso, 1990).

4 Reyner Banham, *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies* (London: Penguin, 1971).

5 *Ibid.*, p. 22.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 31. Banham's four ecologies – surfurbia, the foothills, the Plains of Id, and Autopia – playfully intersected with specific architectural styles.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 96.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 100.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 107.

10 The best analysis of the debris flows is John McPhee's classic essay, "Los Angeles Against the Mountains," in *The Control of Nature* (see note 2).

11 A quick summary appeared in Rodney Steiner, *Los Angeles: The Centrifugal City* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1981).

12 When this article had already been written, an article essentially corroborating it appeared in the *New York Times*: Seth Mydans, "With a Boom in the Desert Over, Transplants Are Feeling Stranded," 26 August 1993.

13 *Los Angeles Times*, 13 December 1992.

14 *Ibid.*, 23 April 1993, sec. B, pp. 1, 2.

15 Matthew Heller, "A Quiet Getaway," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 May 1993.

16 Patrick J. McDonnell, "Backlash Hits Growth-Loving Moreno Valley," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 January 1992.

17 Jonathan Gaw, "As It Turns 150, Tejon Ranch Weighs Development," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 September 1993.

18 McDonnell, "Backlash"; McDonnell, "Referendum on Quality of Life," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 March 1993.

19 Fred Alvarez, "Looking for a Boost in Oxnard," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 February 1993.

20 Paul Feldman, "Trash Dumps May Intrude on Desert Serenity," *Los Angeles Times*, 28 October 1991; "Ward Valley Nuclear Waste Facility Approved," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 September 1993.

21 Among the classic histories of the Irvine Ranch Company and Orange County are Robert Glass Cleland, *The Irvine Ranch* (San Marino, Cal.: Huntington Library, 1962); Nathaniel M. Griffin, *Irvine: The Genesis of a New Community* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute, 1974); Martin J. Schiesl, "Designing the Model Community: The Irvine Company and Suburban Development, 1950–1988," in R. Kling et al., eds., *Postsuburban California: The Transformation of Orange County Since World War II* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 55–91.

22 Pereira conducted two major studies for the new community and the university: William L. Pereira and Associates, "A Preliminary Report for a University-Community Development in Orange County" (1959) and "Second Phase Report for a University-Community Development in Orange County" (1960), Government Publication Files, University of California, Irvine.

23 Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, with Stephanos Polyzoïdes, are the designers and planners associated with Playa Vista.

24 Marla Cone, "Public Gets Invitation to Secluded Canyon," *Los Angeles Times*, 8 May 1993.

25 Gaw, "Tejon Ranch"; Gaw, "Farmers Fear Development Will Go Unchecked," *Los Angeles Times*, 25 April 1993.